Minimum 1000 PAs. Had to have played at least 50% of games at SS. Data from the Baseball Reference Play Index
Rogers Hornsby 150
Carlos Correa 138
Arky Vaughan 137
Alex Rodriguez 132
Vern Stephens 127
Cal Ripken 126
Jim Fregosi 122
By
the way, Hornsby was 2nd in the NL in defensive WAR in both 1917 and
1918 while being almost always a SS (he also played 3 games in the OF in
1918).
Friday, April 27, 2018
Sunday, April 22, 2018
Did a cold and related eye twitch prevent Joe DiMaggio from batting .400 in 1939?
See DiMaggio’s Mysterious Plunge by John B. Holway.
DiMaggio's average was .409 through Sept. 9th but he hit only .233 in his last 73 ABs to finish at .381. One report said he had a virus that had sidelined pitcher Red Ruffing and "Years later Joe would say the cold he had developed on the 9th had caused a painful eye twitch."
But manager Joe McCarthy would not give him a couple of games off to recuperate.
DiMaggio finished with 462 ABs. That means he needed 185 hits to reach .400. He was 17 for his last 73, and finished with a total of 176 hits. So he was 9 hits short of .400. If he had gone 26 for his last 73, he would have made it. That is still a .356 average and even a guy at .400 has no guarantee of reaching that level for a short spurt.
Using the binomial distribution function in Excel, I get that there is a 15% chance of DiMaggio getting 25 or fewer hits in his last 73 ABs (assuming he was truly a .409 hitter).
But was he truly a .409 hitter that year? Or could have been expected to be in Sept? Players usually hit worse in Sept., perhaps due to colder weather. The Yankees as a team batted .270 in Sept. while it was .287 for the whole season (it was .290 thru Aug.). Using the Baseball Reference Play Index, it looks like the Yankee regulars were still used as much as usual in Sept. Maybe with a big lead, they did not quite have their usual incentive. They never lead by less that 11.5 games the whole month. Anyway, if we reduce DiMaggio by 20 points then we expect only a .389 average from Sept. 10th on.
DiMaggio himself batted .319 in Sept/Oct games in his career while it was .325 overall (.326 thru Aug. for his career). So we had to expect some drop off. Also, in his last 19 games, only 2 were on the road and Yankee stadium was not a good place for righties like DiMaggio (it was 467 feet to left center). In his career, he batted .315 at home and .334 on the road. So maybe we reduce him .008 for this. He is down to .381
DiMaggio also had 78 of his 109 ABs in Sept. against righties. That is 71.6%. It was 66.7% for the whole season. Maybe that is 5 ABs more than usual against righties. In his career, DiMaggio batted .342 vs. lefties and .316 vs. righties. This would be a slight effect. Maybe .001. So he is down to .380
That would get him a .400 AVG for the season (and he finishes at .403 or .404). But what are the odds he can still reach .356 if we assume he was a true .380 hitter?). Using the binomial distribution again, I get a 30% chance that he gets 25 or fewer hits in his last 73 ABs if he is a true .380 hitter. That is a high enough chance that we can't assume it was just his illness, eye twitch and lack of rest due to a bad manager that cost him his .400 season.
Now I might have penalized him too much for a lower Sept. average by the Yankees as a whole. If I cut that penalty in half and we make him a true .390 hitter, there is still a 24% chance he does not get the 26 hits he needed in those last 19 games to finish at .400.
DiMaggio's average was .409 through Sept. 9th but he hit only .233 in his last 73 ABs to finish at .381. One report said he had a virus that had sidelined pitcher Red Ruffing and "Years later Joe would say the cold he had developed on the 9th had caused a painful eye twitch."
But manager Joe McCarthy would not give him a couple of games off to recuperate.
"Can we believe that McCarthy didn’t know that his greatest star — the brightest star in America — was in agony? If he did know, did he really make DiMag stay in the game and suffer? Why???!!! McCarthy was an alcoholic, who kept a brown bag with him on the end of the bench, where he sat alone while the coaches apparently ran the team. He was sometimes referred to as a “push button manager,” the closest anyone came to whispering the problem. Eleven years later he would be found literally in the gutter and was swiftly and quietly whisked home to Buffalo and oblivion. No one then, or now, uttered the word “alcoholism.”"If the coaches ran the team, it seems like they could have taken DiMaggio out of the lineup or after just one AB to get him some rest.
DiMaggio finished with 462 ABs. That means he needed 185 hits to reach .400. He was 17 for his last 73, and finished with a total of 176 hits. So he was 9 hits short of .400. If he had gone 26 for his last 73, he would have made it. That is still a .356 average and even a guy at .400 has no guarantee of reaching that level for a short spurt.
Using the binomial distribution function in Excel, I get that there is a 15% chance of DiMaggio getting 25 or fewer hits in his last 73 ABs (assuming he was truly a .409 hitter).
But was he truly a .409 hitter that year? Or could have been expected to be in Sept? Players usually hit worse in Sept., perhaps due to colder weather. The Yankees as a team batted .270 in Sept. while it was .287 for the whole season (it was .290 thru Aug.). Using the Baseball Reference Play Index, it looks like the Yankee regulars were still used as much as usual in Sept. Maybe with a big lead, they did not quite have their usual incentive. They never lead by less that 11.5 games the whole month. Anyway, if we reduce DiMaggio by 20 points then we expect only a .389 average from Sept. 10th on.
DiMaggio himself batted .319 in Sept/Oct games in his career while it was .325 overall (.326 thru Aug. for his career). So we had to expect some drop off. Also, in his last 19 games, only 2 were on the road and Yankee stadium was not a good place for righties like DiMaggio (it was 467 feet to left center). In his career, he batted .315 at home and .334 on the road. So maybe we reduce him .008 for this. He is down to .381
DiMaggio also had 78 of his 109 ABs in Sept. against righties. That is 71.6%. It was 66.7% for the whole season. Maybe that is 5 ABs more than usual against righties. In his career, DiMaggio batted .342 vs. lefties and .316 vs. righties. This would be a slight effect. Maybe .001. So he is down to .380
That would get him a .400 AVG for the season (and he finishes at .403 or .404). But what are the odds he can still reach .356 if we assume he was a true .380 hitter?). Using the binomial distribution again, I get a 30% chance that he gets 25 or fewer hits in his last 73 ABs if he is a true .380 hitter. That is a high enough chance that we can't assume it was just his illness, eye twitch and lack of rest due to a bad manager that cost him his .400 season.
Now I might have penalized him too much for a lower Sept. average by the Yankees as a whole. If I cut that penalty in half and we make him a true .390 hitter, there is still a 24% chance he does not get the 26 hits he needed in those last 19 games to finish at .400.
Friday, April 6, 2018
Explaining Bob Gibson’s 1968 Season
(This was originally published at Beyond the Box Score in 2006)
Most fans know that Gibson had an incredibly low ERA of 1.12
in 1968. Even considering that the league ERA was just 2.98 that year, what he
did is still great. What explains this performance? Did Gibson have a great “stuff”
year? Was he lucky? Or was it a combination of luck and skill? If so, how much
of each?
Luck is sometimes a factor in baseball. Some years a guy
hits well with runners in scoring position (RISP), some years he doesn’t. In
2004, A.J. Pierzynski, for example, hit .272 overall but .307 with RISP. In
2005, he hit .257 overall but only .236 with RISP. Its not likely he forgot how
to hit with RISP all of the sudden. For pitchers, the batting average they
allow on balls in play may be out of their hands (as pointed out by Voros
McCracken). A pitcher might get lucky on balls in play one year, with more
getting caught than normal (or his fielders might be especially good one year).
Is this what happened to Gibson?
To test this, I ran a regression in which a pitcher’s ERA
was the dependent variable and his strikeouts, walks and HRs allowed per 9 IP
were the independent variables. I used the regression equation to predict each
pitcher’s ERA then found out how much it differed from his actual ERA. If a
pitcher had an ERA lower than what his strikeouts, walks and HRs allowed per 9
IP predicted, he most likely gave up fewer hits on balls in play than average.
Here is the regression equation
(1) ERA = 2.19 + 1.436*HR - .159*SO + .303*BB
Again, all stats are per 9 IP. BB includes both walks and
HBP. The data includes all pitchers who qualified for the ERA title from
1963-68 (I used this period since it was an especially low scoring period).
There were 420 pitchers. The r-squared was .548, meaning that 54.8% of the variation
in ERA across pitchers is explained by the equation. The standard error is
.469.
Plugging Gibson’s 1968 data into equation (1) leaves an ERA
of 2.02. That is a very large 0.90 above his actual ERA of 1.12. So it appears
that he must have done especially well on balls in play (more on this later).
The table below shows the leaders in how much lower their predicted ERA was
than actual their ERA.
Rank
|
Pitcher
|
YEAR
|
ERA
|
Pred
|
Diff
|
1
|
Rickey
Clark
|
1967
|
2.59
|
3.81
|
-1.22
|
2
|
Joe
Horlen
|
1968
|
2.37
|
3.48
|
-1.11
|
3
|
Carl
Willey
|
1963
|
3.10
|
4.18
|
-1.08
|
4
|
Lee
Stange
|
1963
|
2.62
|
3.68
|
-1.06
|
5
|
Jim
Perry
|
1965
|
2.63
|
3.64
|
-1.01
|
6
|
Dave
McNally
|
1968
|
1.95
|
2.92
|
-0.97
|
7
|
Tommy
John
|
1968
|
1.98
|
2.91
|
-0.93
|
8
|
Bob
Gibson
|
1968
|
1.12
|
2.02
|
-0.90
|
9
|
Bob
Veale
|
1968
|
2.06
|
2.95
|
-0.89
|
10
|
Joe
Horlen
|
1967
|
2.06
|
2.93
|
-0.87
|
11
|
Vern
Law
|
1965
|
2.16
|
3.01
|
-0.85
|
12
|
Sonny
Siebert
|
1967
|
2.38
|
3.21
|
-0.83
|
13
|
Pete
Richert
|
1965
|
2.60
|
3.41
|
-0.81
|
14
|
Joe
Horlen
|
1964
|
1.88
|
2.69
|
-0.81
|
15
|
Phil
Niekro
|
1967
|
1.87
|
2.68
|
-0.81
|
16
|
Tracy
Stallard
|
1965
|
3.39
|
4.19
|
-0.80
|
17
|
Bobby
Bolin
|
1966
|
2.89
|
3.69
|
-0.80
|
18
|
Denny
McLain
|
1968
|
1.96
|
2.75
|
-0.79
|
19
|
Eddie
Fisher
|
1965
|
2.40
|
3.17
|
-0.77
|
20
|
Jim
Perry
|
1966
|
2.54
|
3.29
|
-0.75
|
21
|
Luis
Tiant
|
1968
|
1.60
|
2.34
|
-0.74
|
22
|
Jim
Bouton
|
1963
|
2.53
|
3.26
|
-0.73
|
23
|
Jerry
Koosman
|
1968
|
2.08
|
2.80
|
-0.72
|
24
|
Milt
Pappas
|
1965
|
2.61
|
3.33
|
-0.72
|
25
|
Steve
Blass
|
1968
|
2.13
|
2.85
|
-0.72
|
Gibson is not first in “Diff” but he did have a big one at
#8 (something intersting is may be going on with the White Sox, with John,
Horlen and Fisher all being up there). The table below shows the 25 lowest
predicted ERAs.
Rank
|
Pitcher
|
YEAR
|
ERA
|
Pred
|
1
|
Bob
Gibson
|
1968
|
1.12
|
2.02
|
2
|
Sandy
Koufax
|
1963
|
1.88
|
2.06
|
3
|
Sandy
Koufax
|
1964
|
1.74
|
2.16
|
4
|
Sandy
Koufax
|
1965
|
2.04
|
2.18
|
5
|
Sandy
Koufax
|
1966
|
1.73
|
2.20
|
6
|
Bob
Moose
|
1968
|
2.74
|
2.22
|
7
|
Bob
Bruce
|
1964
|
2.76
|
2.23
|
8
|
Bob
Veale
|
1965
|
2.84
|
2.24
|
9
|
Bill
Singer
|
1967
|
2.65
|
2.24
|
10
|
Don
Sutton
|
1968
|
2.60
|
2.25
|
11
|
Mike
Cuellar
|
1966
|
2.22
|
2.28
|
12
|
Chris
Short
|
1964
|
2.20
|
2.28
|
13
|
Sam
McDowell
|
1965
|
2.18
|
2.29
|
14
|
Gaylord
Perry
|
1966
|
2.99
|
2.30
|
15
|
Dean
Chance
|
1964
|
1.65
|
2.31
|
16
|
Luis
Tiant
|
1968
|
1.60
|
2.34
|
17
|
Jim
O'Toole
|
1964
|
2.66
|
2.35
|
18
|
Whitey
Ford
|
1964
|
2.13
|
2.37
|
19
|
Gaylord
Perry
|
1968
|
2.44
|
2.37
|
20
|
Tom
Seaver
|
1968
|
2.20
|
2.38
|
21
|
Dean
Chance
|
1968
|
2.53
|
2.39
|
22
|
Bob
Gibson
|
1967
|
2.98
|
2.40
|
23
|
Don
Drysdale
|
1964
|
2.19
|
2.40
|
24
|
Gary
Peters
|
1963
|
2.33
|
2.41
|
25
|
Mike
Cuellar
|
1968
|
2.74
|
2.42
|
Notice that Gibson’s 1968 season, although the best, does
not dominate the way his actual ERA dominates. The next table shows the lowest
25 actual ERAs from the period.
Rank
|
Pitcher
|
YEAR
|
ERA
|
Pred
|
1
|
Bob
Gibson
|
1968
|
1.12
|
2.02
|
2
|
Luis
Tiant
|
1968
|
1.60
|
2.34
|
3
|
Dean
Chance
|
1964
|
1.65
|
2.31
|
4
|
Sandy
Koufax
|
1966
|
1.73
|
2.20
|
5
|
Sandy
Koufax
|
1964
|
1.74
|
2.16
|
6
|
Sam
McDowell
|
1968
|
1.81
|
2.53
|
7
|
Phil
Niekro
|
1967
|
1.87
|
2.68
|
8
|
Sandy
Koufax
|
1963
|
1.88
|
2.06
|
9
|
Joe
Horlen
|
1964
|
1.88
|
2.69
|
10
|
Dave
McNally
|
1968
|
1.95
|
2.92
|
11
|
Denny
McLain
|
1968
|
1.96
|
2.75
|
12
|
Bobby
Bolin
|
1968
|
1.98
|
2.60
|
13
|
Gary
Peters
|
1966
|
1.98
|
2.62
|
14
|
Tommy
John
|
1968
|
1.98
|
2.91
|
15
|
Sandy
Koufax
|
1965
|
2.04
|
2.18
|
16
|
Stan
Bahnsen
|
1968
|
2.05
|
2.71
|
17
|
Joe
Horlen
|
1967
|
2.06
|
2.93
|
18
|
Bob
Veale
|
1968
|
2.06
|
2.95
|
19
|
Jerry
Koosman
|
1968
|
2.08
|
2.80
|
20
|
Dick
Ellsworth
|
1963
|
2.10
|
2.62
|
21
|
Whitey
Ford
|
1964
|
2.13
|
2.37
|
22
|
Steve
Blass
|
1968
|
2.13
|
2.85
|
23
|
Juan
Marichal
|
1965
|
2.14
|
2.67
|
24
|
Don
Drysdale
|
1968
|
2.15
|
2.63
|
25
|
Vern
Law
|
1965
|
2.16
|
3.01
|
In predicted ERA, there are 24 pitchers within .40 or less
of Gibson. But in actual ERA, it is only one!. So using only pitcher determined
outcomes (strikeouts, walks and HRs allowed), brings Gibson back down to earth.
He is the leader, but he is not so far away from the rest of the pitchers.
Now that we have seen these results, lets check to see if
Gibson did indeed have a low batting average allowed on balls in play (BABIP)
in 1968. The table below shows Gibson’s BABIP for each year of his career along
with the BABIP of the entire Cardinal staff (including Gibson). Notice that his
lowest BABIP was in 1968 as well as the difference from the Card’s staff. 1968
was also the biggest difference.
YEAR
|
BABIP-Gibson
|
BABIP-Cards
|
Diff
|
1961
|
0.283
|
0.276
|
0.007
|
1962
|
0.249
|
0.272
|
-0.023
|
1963
|
0.271
|
0.267
|
0.004
|
1964
|
0.272
|
0.275
|
-0.002
|
1965
|
0.256
|
0.273
|
-0.016
|
1966
|
0.240
|
0.267
|
-0.027
|
1967
|
0.280
|
0.268
|
0.012
|
1968
|
0.230
|
0.264
|
-0.034
|
1969
|
0.270
|
0.269
|
0.002
|
1970
|
0.299
|
0.293
|
0.005
|
1971
|
0.270
|
0.291
|
-0.021
|
1972
|
0.263
|
0.277
|
-0.014
|
1973
|
0.255
|
0.271
|
-0.015
|
1974
|
0.272
|
0.274
|
-0.002
|
1975
|
0.303
|
0.283
|
0.020
|
In some years Gibson had a lower BABIP than the Cards staff,
in other years, higher. But he definitely had a low BABIP in 1968 (some of the
numbers in the “Diff” column may look slightly wrong due to rounding). The next
table shows the lowest 25 BABIPs of the period.
Rank
|
Pitcher
|
YEAR
|
BABIP
|
1
|
Dave
McNally
|
1968
|
0.202
|
2
|
Joe
Horlen
|
1967
|
0.214
|
3
|
Wally
Bunker
|
1964
|
0.214
|
4
|
Joe
Horlen
|
1964
|
0.216
|
5
|
Luis
Tiant
|
1968
|
0.216
|
6
|
Phil
Ortega
|
1966
|
0.221
|
7
|
Denny
McLain
|
1966
|
0.221
|
8
|
Juan
Marichal
|
1966
|
0.221
|
9
|
Bobby
Bolin
|
1966
|
0.222
|
10
|
Dick
Hughes
|
1967
|
0.224
|
11
|
Carl
Willey
|
1963
|
0.224
|
12
|
Sonny
Siebert
|
1967
|
0.225
|
13
|
George
Brunet
|
1968
|
0.225
|
14
|
Sonny
Siebert
|
1968
|
0.225
|
15
|
Jim
Bouton
|
1964
|
0.226
|
16
|
Ernie
Broglio
|
1963
|
0.229
|
17
|
Lew
Krausse
|
1968
|
0.229
|
18
|
Bob
Gibson
|
1968
|
0.230
|
19
|
Rickey
Clark
|
1967
|
0.231
|
20
|
Pete
Richert
|
1966
|
0.231
|
21
|
Denny
McLain
|
1968
|
0.231
|
22
|
Jim
Bouton
|
1963
|
0.231
|
23
|
Ken
McBride
|
1963
|
0.233
|
24
|
Bobby
Bolin
|
1968
|
0.233
|
25
|
Moe
Drabowsky
|
1963
|
0.233
|
Gibson did not have the lowest BABIP, but he was #18.
If we try to predict Gibson’s ERA using regression analysis
and also include hits on balls in play, we will be able to predict his ERA much
more accurately. I ran a regression in which a pitcher’s ERA was the dependent
variable and his non-HR hits, walks and HRs allowed per 9 IP were the
independent variables (since I am using what happens on balls in play here, it
is not necessary to put stikeouts in-every strikeout means one less chance for
a hit and the number of hits is already accounted for in the model).
(2) ERA = -2.17 + 1.397*HR + .466*NONHR + .310*BB
The r-squared was .811, meaning that 81.1% of the variation
in ERA across pitchers is explained by the equation. The standard error is
.303. I then predicted each pitcher’s ERA using equation (2) and found how much
that differed from their actual ERA. It predicted Gibson to have a 1.49 ERA.
This is only .37 above his actual ERA, much more accurate than equation (1),
which was off by .90. But the point here is not to find which equation is most
accurate. The point is that once you include what happens on balls in play, we
get a much more accurate picture of Gibson’s performance. And in this case Gibson
was off by just 1.22 standard errors (.37/.303) while he was off by 1.92
standard errors with equation (1) (.90/.469). This supports the thesis that
Gibson was helped quite a bit by his low BABIP.
A few weeks ago a I posted an article about the best seasons
in something called “Fielding Independent ERA” or FIP ERA (see sources at the
end of this article). In that article I used a more sophisticated approach than
I used here. The lowest 25 FIP ERAs of this period are in the table below.
Rank
|
Pitcher
|
YEAR
|
FIP ERA
|
1
|
Sam
McDowell
|
1965
|
1.96
|
2
|
Bob
Gibson
|
1968
|
2.21
|
3
|
Sandy
Koufax
|
1963
|
2.23
|
4
|
Al
Downing
|
1963
|
2.25
|
5
|
Sandy
Koufax
|
1966
|
2.28
|
6
|
Bob
Veale
|
1965
|
2.30
|
7
|
Gary
Peters
|
1963
|
2.32
|
8
|
Sonny
Siebert
|
1965
|
2.32
|
9
|
Gaylord
Perry
|
1966
|
2.32
|
10
|
Sandy
Koufax
|
1964
|
2.38
|
11
|
Dick
Radatz
|
1964
|
2.39
|
12
|
Luis
Tiant
|
1968
|
2.39
|
13
|
Steve
Hargan
|
1966
|
2.43
|
14
|
Dean
Chance
|
1964
|
2.46
|
15
|
Mike
Cuellar
|
1966
|
2.49
|
16
|
Chris
Short
|
1964
|
2.50
|
17
|
Whitey
Ford
|
1964
|
2.51
|
18
|
Bill
Singer
|
1967
|
2.53
|
19
|
Sam
McDowell
|
1968
|
2.55
|
20
|
Sam
McDowell
|
1966
|
2.56
|
21
|
Bob
Bruce
|
1964
|
2.57
|
22
|
Bob
Moose
|
1968
|
2.60
|
23
|
Dean
Chance
|
1968
|
2.62
|
24
|
Jim
O'Toole
|
1964
|
2.63
|
25
|
Jim
Maloney
|
1963
|
2.67
|
Notice that Gibson is only second (the FIP ERA’s do not
completely correspond to predicted or actual ERAs mentioned earlier since all
ERAs in the FIP ERA study are normalized to a league with an ERA of about
3.70). The FIP ERAs here are also different because HRs allowed were adjusted
for park effects, something not done for the above analysis.
We can tell from the following stats that Gibson’s
performance in 1968 was not as far above his other seasons as ERAs alone would
indicate. The table below shows his strikeouts, walks and HRs allowed per
batter faced for each year in his career with 100 or more IP. 1968 is clearly
his best, but some other seasons rival it. In 1970, for example, his strikeout
and HR rates are very close to 1968. In 1967, his strikeout rate and BB rate
were similar to that of 1968. But 1970 was a much higher scoring season than
1968 with the NL ERA being 4.05. Gibson’s fielding independent stats in 1970
are almost as good as they were in 1968.
YEAR
|
SO/BFP
|
BB/BFP
|
HR/BFP
|
1961
|
0.181
|
0.136
|
0.014
|
1962
|
0.215
|
0.109
|
0.016
|
1963
|
0.188
|
0.100
|
0.017
|
1964
|
0.206
|
0.080
|
0.021
|
1965
|
0.219
|
0.092
|
0.028
|
1966
|
0.201
|
0.074
|
0.018
|
1967
|
0.209
|
0.061
|
0.014
|
1968
|
0.231
|
0.059
|
0.009
|
1969
|
0.212
|
0.083
|
0.009
|
1970
|
0.226
|
0.076
|
0.011
|
1971
|
0.180
|
0.081
|
0.014
|
1972
|
0.186
|
0.081
|
0.013
|
1973
|
0.180
|
0.076
|
0.015
|
1974
|
0.124
|
0.105
|
0.023
|
1975
|
0.120
|
0.132
|
0.020
|
The next table shows his FIPERAs for the years 1961-1974
(season when he had at least 150 IP).
Year
|
FIP ERA
|
1961
|
3.08
|
1962
|
2.56
|
1963
|
3.31
|
1964
|
3.15
|
1965
|
3.47
|
1966
|
3.08
|
1967
|
2.69
|
1968
|
2.21
|
1969
|
2.46
|
1970
|
1.96
|
1971
|
3.03
|
1972
|
2.90
|
1973
|
3.12
|
1974
|
4.87
|
As mentioned earlier, these FIP ERAs are all normalized for
a league with about a 3.70 ERA. According to this, Gibson was better in 1970
than in 1968. That is, taking park effects into account to adjust HRs, using
only pitcher controlled stats and comparing to the league average shows his
1970 season to be even better. This, too, suggests that 1968 was helped quite a
bit by a very low BABIP. The big difference between the two seasons was his
BABIP of .230 in 1968 and his .299 BABIP in 1970. The 1968 BABIP was far below
the team BABIP while his 1970 BABIP was above the team BABIP.
I also broke down his performance into RISP and non-RISP
situations to try to understand how his ERA could have been so low. He allowed
a batting average of .184 overall but just .141 with RISP (and .193 in non-RISP
situations). To see if this made any difference, I ran a regression with ERA as
the dependent variable and on-base percentage (OBP) and slugging percentage
(SLG) were the independent variables. That predicted Gibson to have an ERA of
1.25 (just using pitchers from 1968). Then I broke down OBP and SLG into RISP
and non-RISP situations. The resulting regression equation predicted Gibson to
have an ERA of 1.13. So his RISP performance also helped a little in making his
ERA so low since the regression that took RISP into account was more accurate.
His career average allowed overall was .228 while with RISP it was .219. Those
two are pretty close, indicating that Gibson probably did not have any special
ability with RISP. He just happened to do very well in those situations in
1968.
I also took the natural log of ERA in one of the regressions
in case ERA had a non-linear relationship with the other stats. Doing this did
not improve the results.
There is one other issue with the fielding in 1968. It
appears that Gibson got a little lucky in 1968 with more balls in play than
average being turned into outs. Perhaps the fielders were playing better or
trying harder behind Gibson that year than they were for the other Cardinal
pitchers. But Gibson actually gave up more unearned runs than would be expected
as compared to the entire Cardinal staff. The staff ERA was 2.49 or 1.37 above
Gibson. But if we include all runs, Gibson gave up 1.45 runs per 9 IP while it
was 2.87 for the whole staff or 1.42 higher than Gibson. So by adding in
unearned runs, the difference between Gibson and the team grows. Gibson’s runs
per 9 IP was 29.46% above his ERA while
for the whole staff it was 15.26% higher. So Gibson was hurt more by unearned
runs than the whole team, indicating that his fielders hurt him. Perhaps they
were hustling more and simply got to more balls, leading to more errors. Maybe
official scorers called more errors than expected to protect Gibson’s ERA (it
is true that Gibson’s runs per 9 IP is .33 higher than his ERA while it is .38
for the whole staff, possibly showing that Gibsons was hurt less by unearned
runs-but with fewer base runners allowed, any given error should have hurt him
less so a .33 increase is proportionally worse for him than a .38 increase was
for the whole team).
Sources:
The Complete Baseball Encyclopedia from Lee Sinins
The
Best Fielding Independent Pitching Seasons From 1920-2005
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)